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COMMENTARY

STRATEGY’S EVANGELIST

Lawrence Freedman

I was not an exact contemporary of Colin Gray and our careers were not quite
parallel, yet it was pretty close on both counts. He was five years older, but we were
both undergraduates at Manchester University and did doctorates at Oxford. He
began his career working on arms races and nuclear strategy but then branched
out to write much more broadly on strategy, and so did I. We overlapped very
briefly at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the autumn of 1975
until he had a spectacular falling-out with the director, Christoph Bertram, over,
I believe, some biting criticism Colin had written of U.S. Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger’s readiness to do deals with the Soviet Union. Colin then went off to
work with Herman Kahn and Donald Brennan at the Hudson Institute before
setting up the National Institute for Public Policy with Keith Payne. For the next
few years I was the dove on arms control and Colin was the hawk, and so began
a relationship that lasted until his death.
We regularly sparred, often disagreed, but treated each other with mutual
respect. One of the most refreshing things about Colin was that disagreement
was never complete. Even if you were wrongheaded on one issue it was perfectly
possible that you had something worthwhile to say on another. Thus his toughminded realism was far removed from the more optimistic ideas of Ken Booth,
yet Colin regularly cited Ken’s book on ethnocentrism in strategy, and Ken was
an influence on the way Colin thought about the
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his books were almost a form of conversation. I realized to my embarrassment
when preparing this essay that he had sent me copies of most of his main works
with a charming personal note, and I really had not reciprocated. In the note for
The Strategy Bridge he wrote that he feared he “may have achieved the deserved
fate of Icarus.” But he did not fall from the sky with melting wings; instead, this
book—perhaps more than any other—cemented his reputation as one of the most
profound and stimulating strategic thinkers of this century.
In each book—and there were many—the reader was joining Colin on a journey. As each volume concluded there was little more than a pause before he was
off again. He never seemed truly confident that he had reached his destination,
which is perhaps why he returned regularly to the same themes, looking for a new
and better way to convey his distinctive views. His arguments were refreshed each
time. He anticipated likely objections, acknowledging their potential force before
explaining why they were not conclusive, offering a choice historical example,
quoting approvingly from a helpful authority, or adding a neat aphorism. And then
the argument would continue unabated in long footnotes, in which more examples
and quotes could be found. In the next book the argument would be refined and
at times amended, with different examples and many new insights. This was the
subject he never could let go and to which he kept returning. He opened the preface of Strategy Bridge by reporting that every decade he tried to write a “fairly bold
book.”2 This one, published in 2010, was the third in the series after War, Peace,
and Victory in 1990 and Modern Strategy in 1999.3 In the following years he published new books, working over the same themes, on an extraordinarily regular
basis, until his last book, Theory of Strategy, was published in 2018.4
Colin’s discursive and often dense style meant that he never could be accused
of oversimplification. “Poetry, this is not,” he wrote in his preface to Strategy
Bridge. You had to read carefully, but if you did there always would be pleasant
discoveries, whether snippets of unexpected history, telling quotes, or satisfying
conjunctions of ideas. Behind everything he wrote was an extraordinary level of
erudition. Colin could discuss, with equal facility, centuries of military history,
the nuances of contemporary security debates, and the character of modern
weaponry. Although he had important things to say about nuclear arms control,
geopolitics, and the role of navies, underlying everything was his view of the
importance of strategy.
Colin’s writings were prescriptive. His aim was not simply to explain historical
events or explore recurring features of international affairs but to improve the
practice of strategy. He turned naturally to history as the master discipline for
strategy and was wary about the value of quantitative social science.5 Yet he knew
his way around the social sciences and he engaged directly when it came, for
example, to the question of the impact of culture on strategic practice.6 At the
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
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same time he was not a historian. Unlike many of the great strategists he admired,
including Clausewitz, he did not immerse himself in the detail of particular campaigns to hone his theories through case studies. He was not trying to sort out
the past but the present. He studied strategy, and strategic issues, to produce better policy. He acknowledged that he was not averse to “lobbying for programs in
which I believe or writing the occasional polemic to make a case that I believe in,”
but in his most important works he insisted that his aim was to understand what
strategy was about rather than to make a case for specific strategies and their associated budgets.7 He did not wish to be described as an advocate, because he was
not making his case to meet the demands of a particular brief. But he nonetheless
was something of an evangelist on behalf of strategy, pointing to the calamities
that had befallen those who had failed to grasp the essentials of sound strategic
thinking and the achievements of those who had paid attention. His writings on
strategy were intended not only to elucidate the concept but to get people in responsible positions to think in ways that would produce better strategies. “Strategists cannot be trained,” he observed, “but they can be educated.”8
Colin’s starting point was that the phenomena he was addressing were timeless. The context changed because of political events, new technologies, or even
tactical fashions, but at the heart of any discussion of strategy were military
power and the purposes for which it could be used. “Strategy is ever varying in
character, but not in its nature, which is unchanging.”9 This was certainly true at
one level, since conflict is a constant, as is force as the ultimate means by which
conflicts are resolved. At any stage in history commanders seeking to use force
effectively to get the desired result might be confronted with sets of issues that
their predecessors or successors could recognize easily. They might be considering the virtues of a frontal assault versus trying to catch the enemy by surprise or
laying siege. They would be taking into account climate and terrain; looking to
the balance of forces, both quantitatively and qualitatively; wondering whether
innovations in weapons and tactics might make a difference; remaining conscious of intangibles such as the state of morale; and so on.
But strategy also has changed a lot. It has become increasingly rare for the
same person to set both political objectives and military means, and those at the
top are likely to be positioned well away from the front. They rely on large staffs
and elaborate chains of command even to manage quite routine military activities. The means at their disposal are many and varied and, for a number of powers, now include nuclear weapons. Those weapons’ huge destructive potential
has reduced dramatically the attraction of war as an instrument of policy and has
led to a search for ways of achieving political objectives short of war.10 Early in
his career Colin had thought that nuclear weapons did not challenge traditional
concepts of strategy, but by the end of his life he was not so sure.11
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss1/4
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The challenge for Colin was to develop a unified theory of strategy that could
be timeless in its application yet take account of all these changes. His approach
followed naturally from the presumption of timelessness and was based on the
conviction that it was hard to improve on the thoughts of those who first had the
chance to reflect on military power. In his Fighting Talk he asserted provocatively
that “If Thucydides, Sun-tzu, and Clausewitz Did Not Say It, It Probably Is Not
Worth Saying.” He followed this up with the assertion that “[t]here are no new ideas
in strategy. Instead there is a stock of concepts of great antiquity, whose exact provenance is unknown and unknowable.”12 Those theorists in each generation who try
to update the classics (I presume he included himself) are “invariably disappointing.” By the time of Strategy Bridge he was slightly more cautious in his claims,
at that point listing ten books in the canon (the contemporary additions were all
Western), now classed according to merit (Clausewitz was in a class by himself).13
It is possible to recognize that these works constitute a sort of canon—and all
do repay careful reading—while still finding the sentiment disturbing. The view
that there is nothing new under the sun was popular in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when officers were obliged to read the classics of antiquity such
as Polybius, Frontinus, and Vegetius. In the nineteenth century it was a common
view, encouraged by Antoine-Henri, Baron de Jomini, that strategic principles
were unchanging. Therefore, to understand strategy it was mainly necessary to
study the campaigns of the great generals.14 Once this view became part of military
education the effect was to encourage a stultifying orthodoxy. Only as new wars
came along that did not fit the models of the past—in particular, that were not
resolved through decisive battles—did strategic thought begin to open up to other
possibilities. Even when this happened it was possible to scour the canon to legitimize an otherwise heretical new thought, just as communists would do with Marx,
Engels, and Lenin, to find a sentence or two to justify a change in the party line.
As with the assertion on timelessness, there is a point to be made about the
persistence of core ideas, but after a point it becomes a bit of a game, of the same
sort that philosophers can play with Plato and Aristotle. If reversion to the classics becomes a habit, then at least it is necessary to understand the intellectual
life around these key thinkers. To understand Clausewitz, for example, is it also
necessary to understand Hegel? These were men of their time, and times do
change. The intellectual influences on contemporary strategic thought—whether
nuclear physics or cognitive psychology, the claims of totalitarians or hostility
to empires—produce different ideas. That is what makes the study of strategic
thought productive.
Colin even considered whether it was possible to rely solely on Clausewitz.
The Prussian was the one who best had grasped the essentials of modern warfare
and who still provided the most valuable framework through which thoughts on
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
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war could be organized. “Whether I have been studying nuclear targeting, the
leverage of seapower, or the strategic utility of special operations,” Colin wrote,
“Clausewitz’s On War has been my constant companion and by far the most heavily used book in my library.”15 He understood that the great man was not always
easy to follow and did not get everything right (for example, regarding the importance of intelligence), but Colin placed himself firmly within a Clausewitzian
tradition of strategic inquiry.
This meant, above all, that war without policy was mindless violence. The vital
role of strategy was to show how military means could serve political ends. The
challenge of strategy was that this was difficult. Colin discussed many different
definitions in his publications, tending to dismiss those that were too longwinded or failed to make the link with policy (for example, Martin van Creveld’s
“the method by which . . . armed forces wage war”).16 He liked Wylie’s definition
of strategy as a “plan of action designed to achieve some end; a purpose together
with a system of measures for its accomplishment.”17 But he kept coming back to
Clausewitz’s (“the use of engagements for the objective of war”) because it had the
virtue not only of concision but of providing a sharp distinction from tactics (“the
use of armed forces in the engagement”).18 He did not accept that the definition
was too narrowly operational, although he acknowledged that it might be seen
that way. He also broadened the scope much more when he got to grand strategy,
in which he included all the potential instruments of power.
In the opening to Modern Strategy Colin introduced strategy as “the bridge
that relates military power to political purpose.”19 Here he adopted the strong
metaphor with which he is now so closely associated. By the time he got to putting it in the title, with The Strategy Bridge, this provided an overall theme. So he
returned to the issue of definitions. He acknowledged that over the years he had
favored a number of them, although each one risked being too exclusive (as with
Clausewitz) or too inclusive (so that any focus was lost). He doubted a perfect
definition could be found; strategy was “an idea, a function, a behaviour that
almost begs to be abused as a consequence of misapprehension.”20 He settled on
the following: “The direction and use made of means by chosen ways in order to
achieve desired ends.” This had the advantage of fitting in with the ends, ways,
and means formulation that the U.S. and U.K. armed forces favored.21
By his final book, Colin was convinced that this was by far the best formula
and was surprised that he had not appreciated it earlier. “While I have long
suspected that the theory of strategy was obedient to no limits traceable either
to history or geography,” he remarked, “the true ubiquity, universality, and indeed eternity—for want of a better concept—of strategy did not dawn on me
for many years.” Now, after fifty years, he was convinced that “there was no
alternative framework for the theory of strategy.” Ends, means, and ways would
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss1/4
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be “functioning regardless of our skill.” It was a framework that could “apply in
all times and in all geographies. Shifts in technology, geographical context, and
ideational preferences should not trouble it all.” However, while the framework
could help order thoughts, it could not generate the actual thoughts.22
More important than a precise definition was that strategy was part of a wider
and coherent conceptual framework, with policy as the source of political objectives and tactics as actual military behavior. The issue for Colin in his efforts to
build a unified theory was how to capture the holistic character of strategy, bringing together activities that otherwise might be treated as autonomous realms.
Policy, strategy, and tactics had to be seen as interdependent—they all needed
each other. Tactics without strategy could achieve nothing, yet without the available means some objectives never could be achieved. The problem of the need to
change objectives if they were beyond reach was not quite captured in his own
definition, probably because he wished to stress the hierarchy that began with
policy and then descended down to tactics.23 This hierarchy led to an ideal type
describing how all the different levels of strategy should come together. “I insist
that a vision of a politically desirable condition should inspire policy choices
which should be supported by a strategy which makes proper use of an operational competence founded upon tactical excellence.”24
The problem was that it was unusual for this ideal to be reached. At each
level, guidance, competence, and excellence might be lacking. The point about a
holistic approach, however, was that it “captures or corrals the whole; it does not
assume a perfect coordination of the whole.” Perfect coordination simply might
be impossible for reasons beyond the control of the strategist, and even when
attainable it still would be extremely hard to achieve. The whole point about
strategy was that it involved opponents who also would be acting strategically; as
he put it in another of his maxims, “the enemy has a vote.”
The restlessness in Colin’s investigations into strategy flowed from this determination to develop a holistic approach, to cover what T. E. Lawrence had called
the “whole house.”25 The framework captured the timelessness, but something
was needed to take account of the timely. What did strategists need to consider
to make the right policy choices? He took as a starting point “The Forgotten
Dimensions of Strategy,” Michael Howard’s 1979 essay on the dimensions of strategy—except that, in contrast to Howard’s four dimensions, Colin came up with
seventeen.26 These were as follows: people, society, culture, politics, ethics, economics and logistics, organization, administration, information and intelligence,
strategic theory and doctrine, technology, operations, command, geography,
friction/chance/uncertainty, adversary, and time. Proper strategy required that
these be considered holistically—that is, both individually and in context with
the others. They were grouped together under three broad headings: “People
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
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and Politics,” then “Preparation for War,” and “War Proper.”27 The dimensions
as an organizing device were not carried forward into Strategy Bridge, although
in an appendix they could be found as “21 Dicta of Strategy,” backed up by “14
Skeleton Keys of Theory.” Before the dimensions there had been the “40 Maxims”
and in Theory of Strategy there were “23 Principles.” If these lists were assumed
to be part of Colin’s core theory, then all this was confusing. One day a graduate
student might try to chart the inclusions and exclusions and identify the common
themes, but a better explanation for the varying lists is that at any particular time
they simply helped Colin organize his thoughts.28
This constant striving to improve and develop his theories reflected a problem
he had set for himself at the start of his career that never could be solved fully. Colin’s aim was to produce a theory of strategy that would result in better strategy. It
thus tended toward the development of an ideal type of strategist who might be
more capable of producing an ideal type of strategy. Colin wanted to push up the
standard, and in the high-stakes situations that truly interested him—when matters of war and peace were being decided—we should expect the appropriate level
of professionalism from those making policy and those advising them. Inevitably,
as he fully recognized, practice would fall short of the ideal type. The question
he continued to pose was what difference good theory and a good theorist could
make to the practice.
When preparing this piece, I found a critique I wrote in 1983 of two of Colin’s
early books on strategy.29 His authorial voice already was well established. I noted
his “iconoclasm, refusal to bow to the conventional wisdom, willingness to ask
awkward questions and to offer uncompromising and sometimes outrageous
answers” and remarked on his “restless pen, which can rarely resist a tangent and
happily allows substantial insights to get lost in asides.” The basic issue behind
my review, however, concerned the role of the strategic theorist. Colin then was
working in a think tank in the United States, and he labeled himself as a “civilian
defense professional.” He described with admirable candor how this role could
push the scholar (and he was adamant that it was vital to stay in touch with the
world of scholarship) into the cut and thrust of political debate. Although governments had managed perfectly well without civilian strategists for centuries,
the Cold War had created a novel situation, especially with regard to nuclear
weapons. Although highly critical of the actual performance of the strategic
studies community—not least in its uncritical support of arms control but also in
its hubristic embrace of doubtful theories of counterinsurgency in Vietnam—he
believed that it could and must do better.30 Out of these pages a code of conduct
emerged: stay close to empirical material; keep in touch with technology, but
never neglect the study of history or fail to recognize the importance of political
and cultural factors; remember to consider how military forces might be operated
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss1/4
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in wartime, as well as how they look in peacetime; and keep the first-order question of the role of military power in international affairs to the fore.31
This was a code that Colin followed throughout his life. In my review I noted
that this was not necessarily a way to attract the attention or approval of policy
makers. Indeed, at issue was how the specialist, focused on a specific issue, could
address the generalist, distracted by many issues. I suggested that it was as useful
to contribute to policy debate as to get closeted with officialdom. In addition,
Colin had written that “the strategist is licensed to analyze and often to propose,
not to dispose.”32 This seemed to me to get it the wrong way ’round. To be sure,
those with the best methodologies and conceptual grasp and the cleverest proposals should be listened to and could influence policy, but in the end the only
true strategists were those who had to take responsibility for the consequences
of their decisions, measured in lives, values, and even the fate of whole societies.
In retrospect, part of my critique was quite unfair. Colin never shirked his
role as an active debater, let alone as an educator, and contributed throughout his
career to public discourse, including by being unafraid to take positions that challenged the mainstream. With regard to the second point, I think there remained
a tension. It may be that in the 1980s he hoped that governments might consult
strategists in the same way they did economists, allowing them to bring a real
expertise to bear that policy makers would welcome and embrace. He would not
have been alone in that view. At the very least, the academic strategist could help
the policy maker think his way through the perplexing issues of national security. Especially in the nuclear age, a political leader not well versed in the arcana
of weapons systems and deterrence theory might well rely on such an informed
civilian as much as on a general.
Colin opened one of his last books with the following statement: “I am a strategist. For fifty years I have spoken, written, and sought to advise governments
about strategy.”33 It is hard to begrudge him the title, yet how much could a theorist and adviser be an actual strategist? In French there is a distinction between
the label stratégiste for the nonpractitioner and stratège for the practitioner.34
My view—in that review, and still today—was and remains that the only true
strategists are those with executive responsibility—the stratège. I think that Colin basically agreed. In Strategy Bridge and elsewhere, he highlighted “executive
strategists” as the key actors, as opposed to the adviser or educator, and stressed
the importance of command as the means by which they executed strategy.
In this book Colin’s concluding chapter provides an excellent, straightforward
description of what executive strategy in practice is all about. The strategist seeks
control over the course of events, and that requires thinking about causation and
consequences. This is difficult. The effort to achieve strategic effects can be frustrated not only by the enemy but by dysfunctional policy-making processes. It is
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
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necessary to “influence enemies, allies, and neutrals, which means minds and actions, foreign and domestic.” So the “would-be controller of history is ever locked
into a struggle against severe odds.” By way of consolation, the need is to be “good
enough,” for the challenge is to be better than the strategist on the other side. Of
course, it is possible that the strategist will fail, but some failures are worse than
others, and at least good strategy in bad conditions will avoid the worst consequences. In this chapter the strategic theorist appears as one engaged in educating
“executive strategists that they are mentally equipped to tackle their historically
unique problems as well as they can be enabled.”35
The difficulty here was that the ideal-type strategist that emerged from Colin’s
many books was much more likely to be stratégiste, with the time for proper study
and contemplation, than stratège, rushed and distracted while making the executive decisions. The final chapter of Strategy Bridge was subtitled the “Strategist
as Hero.” Colin explained: “The subject truly is challenging and the strategist’s
role, properly understood, should be recognized as heroic. To be performed well,
its multiple demands require extraordinary natural gifts, advantages that need
nurturing by education and experience.”36
The strategist had to be properly educated into this role. “Only the educated
strategist can be trusted to develop the multilevel body of doctrine that must
serve to staple together synergistically efforts in performance at every level of
warfare.” In Modern Strategy he had described a strategist as someone rather
special, with an “exceedingly demanding” job description, able to see the “big
picture” and familiar with all of war’s dimensions.37
It seemed to me that Colin had an overexalted view of the strategist as a rather
special person, able to appreciate sets of complex interdependencies and to grasp
the numerous factors at play in a conflict so as to identify where effort could be
applied most profitably. In practice they would do the best they could, but however many lectures they had attended or books they had read or whatever the
quality of the advisers at hand, they would not be able to organize their thoughts
and action in ways close to those of the ideal strategist Colin identified. In my
own book on strategy, which came out in 2013, I included a chapter entitled “The
Myth of the Master Strategist.” My main target in this was not so much Colin as
Harry Yarger, who had picked up on the seventeen dimensions and taken them
a stage further, by describing strategic thinking as being “about thoroughness
and holistic thinking.” It required a “comprehensive knowledge of what else is
happening within the strategic environment and the potential first-, second-,
and third-order effects of its own choices on the efforts of those above, below,
and on the strategist’s own level.” Yarger wanted the strategist to be a student of
the present who must be aware of the past, sensitive to the possibilities of the
future, conscious of the danger of bias, alert to ambiguity, alive to chaos, ready
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss1/4
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to think through the consequences of alternative courses of action, and then
able to articulate all this with sufficient precision for those who must execute its
prescriptions.38 Even Colin had worried that this “appeared to encourage, even
demand, an impossibility.”39 But I included him in the end as subscribing to this
myth of a master strategist.
It is fair to say that Colin took exception to this characterization. In his review
of my book, which actually was quite generous, he argued that the chapter should
have been retitled “The Myth of the Myth of the Master Strategist.” His objection
was that master strategists were rare but feasible. “If the idea is understood sensibly as requiring demonstrated good enough mastery on the dimensions of strategy
that are most essential to the context of time and place, my argument is readily
supportable.”40 The examples he gave from the Second World War—Air Chief
Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding and Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke—to some extent
reinforced my point, because my concern was the belief that the master strategist
was set to operate within the military sphere; whereas, as far as I was concerned,
“[t]he only people who could be master strategists were political leaders, because
they were the ones who had to cope with the immediate and often competing
demands of disparate actors, diplomats as well as generals, ministers along with
technical experts, close allies and possible supporters.”41 I was not arguing that
masterful strategists at times did not come up with exceptional strategies that
achieved their objectives, but instead (as I explained in an exchange with Daniel
Steed) that the truly masterful strategic person required exceptionally demanding
qualities, which might be no more than good judgment, and then needed appropriate circumstances before those qualities could come into play, and that these
circumstances would pass. “Consistently high strategic performance is extremely
hard. Even those who perform well for a while rarely sustain their performance
over time. Great strategists emerge in relationship to great situations.”42
I wish I had had a proper conversation with Colin about this. My view of where
a master strategist might be found—as he would put it, at the level of policy—was
actually close to his own view of strategy’s proper hierarchy. My characterization
of his views risked caricature. Yet there was a real difference between us. Colin
regretted the migration of strategy as a concept from the military sphere into
many others, including business, whereas I found this intriguing, so I broadened
my studies accordingly. When it came to the military sphere, we agreed on the
importance of strategies; on the value of concepts in making sense of them; and
that, in essence, it was all about the relationship between military means and political ends. My approach was more skeptical. An ideal strategist working with an
ideal strategic theory, founded on the classics of the field, was going to be a very
rare beast who as likely as not would struggle with forms of conflict other than
major war, for which the theories were not necessarily appropriate. I could see
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
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how intuition as much as educated deliberation (for which there may not be time)
still could produce good results. I took it for granted that strategies were going
to be suboptimal, produced by fallible people relying on imperfect organization
and inadequate information.
And yet, what would we have done without Colin telling us what good strategic theory and practice should look like? The suboptimal offended Colin. He
was an evangelist for strategy, demanding that people take the subject seriously,
and encouraging those professionally engaged with war and conflict to join him
in his quest to improve both our understanding of what it entailed and strategic
performance in practice. He was well aware that a life spent worrying about how
wars should be deterred, fought, and concluded might be seen as representing an
odd career choice. We should be grateful that it is the one he took.
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